RESTRICTED

SECOND WORLD WAR 

(NAVAL OPERATIONS)

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Tibis information is disclosed only for official use by the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal or secrecy, as may be engaged on a defence projtect. Disclosure to any other Government or release to the Press or disclosure in any other way would be a breach of these condiitions. The infornustion shoold be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standart of security as tliat maintained by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdoni. The recipient is wanied that information contained in this document may be subject to privately-owned rights.

HISTORICAL SECTION

ADMIRALTY

FOREWORD

Page

Note on Sources vii

Abbreviations vii

CHAPTER 1. PREPARATIONS

Section Page

CHAPTER V. THE AIR BATTLE

35 Air forces 40

36 Enemy air opposition 41

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

37 Comment and reflection 42

Appendices

A Naval forces

I. List of H.M. Ships 43

II. Organization 47

B Military and Air forces 49

C Casualties

I Allied losses 50

II. Enemy losses 52

D Types of landing craft 53

E Analysis of bombing attacks 54

F Summary of lessons learnt 55

G Extracts from German reports 57

INDEX 87

 

 

 

Plans

(at end of book)

3 Disposition of naval force during the passage

4 Action with enemy naval forces, 0347, 19th August

5 Plot of enemy convoy, 18-l9th August

6 Dieppe-after the raid

vi

Note on Sources

30th August 1942, referred to throughout as "M." This contains the detailed narrative of the Naval Force Commander (not included in B.R.) and his conclusions and recommendations. It also contains a number of reports from commanding officers of ships and landing craft and from senior officers of groups. Some of the reports are not complete, being extracts only from the original and, in a number of them, times are not given.

3. Conference on Landing Assaults (two volumes), issued by the United States Assault Training Centre, E.T.O.U.S.A., and here referred to as "L." Volume I contains an address given on 26th May 1943, by Captain Hughes Hallett on the Dieppe Raid, and an address by General Roberts, who was Military Force Commander at Dieppe.

4. N.I.D. 07886/44. Report by the German C.-in-C., West (Field-Marshal von Rundstedt), containing a report from G.O.C., 8lst Army Corps, in whose area Dieppe lay, and also from G.O.C. 15th Army. This is referred to as the" German Report". It in an English translation of an Italian version of the German original. The text may have suffered in the double translation.

5. C.B.4051 (49). Interrogation of survivors of German Armed Trawler U.J.1404.

6. The Royal Marines Report (R.M. 10410/42).

7. M.3146/45. Report of Lt. P. Ross, R.N.V.R., Beachmaster, White bench.

8. H. and A. 809/45. Award to Lt. D. T. Bibby, R.N.V.R., Beachmaster, Red beach.

9. H. and A. l235/45. Report of Commander G. T. Lambert, R.N.

10. The Canadian Army, 1939-45, by Colonel C. P. Stacey, chapters 4 and 5.

11. Sir Years of War (Official History of the Canadian Army), by Colonel C. P. Stacey, Vol.1, Chapters X , XI, XII 12. The Memoirs of Field- Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Collins, 1958).

13. Notes by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes Hallett, February 1958.

14. Notes by Vice-Admiral T. Baillie-Grohman, June 1957.

 

vii

A.A. Anti-aircraft L.C.T. landing craft, tank

B.R. See Note on Sources L.S.I. landing ship, infantry

C.C.O. Chief of Combined Operations M. See Note on Sources

C.-in-C. Commander-in-Chief M.F.C. Military Force Commander

C.O. Commanding Officer M.G.B. motor gunboat

E-boat German armed motor boat M.L. motor launch

(British term) M.T.B. motor torpedo boat (British)

E.TO.U.S.A. EuropeanTheatre of Operations, N.F.C. Naval Force Commander

U.S. Army

R-boat motor boat used for mine-

F.0.0. Forward Observation Officer sweeping (German term)

G.O.C. General Officer Commanding R.M. Royal Marines

H.Q. Headquarters S-boat German M.T.B. (German term)

L. See Note on Sources S.G.E. steam gunboat

L.C.A. Landing craft, assault S.0. Senior Officer

L.C.F. landing craft, flak T.O.O. time of origin (of signals)

L.C.M. landing craft, mechanized U.J. anti-submarine trawler

L.C.P. landing craft, personnel (German term)

L.C.S. Landing craft, support U.S.A.A.C. United States Army Air Corps

Note.- The letters L, M, S, often found in brackets after landing craft, mean Large, Medium and Small.

CHAPTER I

Preparations

2

It was against this background that the raid on Dieppe, first known as Operation "Rutter" and later renamed "Jubilee ", was undertaken. This was the largest raid actually carried out, and the only one in which the landing of tanks was attempted and in which more than an hour or two was allowed for military operations on shore; it was also the last, because the available landing craft were soon afterwards required for use in the North African expedition, and subsequently the strategic policy regarding raids underwent a change.

2. DIEPPE: DEFENCES

The town and port of Dieppe contained several military objectives such as stores, docks, shipping, railway yards, a radar station at Caude-Cote and the fighter airfield of St. Aubin on the western outskirts of the town. It was estimated that the defences were comparatively weak and manned by second-rate troops. The port was also well within range of English shore-based fighters. In other respects Dieppe was not altogether an easy target for a surprise landing. It lies in a stretch of chalk cliff which extend from Cap d'Antifer to the town of Ault, 56 miles to the north-east. In the vicinity of the port they are fairly high and present an almost unbroken front to the sea. The only considerable gap is at Dieppe itself, where the river Argues enters the Channel. Other openings in the neighbourhood are few and confined. The beaches are narrow and rocky, with occasional ledges which render landings almost impracticable at or near low water. Smooth water was essential for any undertaking, and wind in excess of force 3 was said to cause a swell. Under these circumstances, in the opinion of Combined Operations Headquarters, opportunities for landing were limited to " about two days a month on an average during the summer."1 Dieppe, however, was regarded as the only objective which was a "worth-while" target and yet a practicable one from the point of view of distance, defences and beaches.

So far as was known, the defences of Dieppe consisted of a battery of six 5.9-in. naval guns at Varengeville (" Hess " Battery) and a battery of four

5.9-in. naval guns at Berneval (" Goebbels" Battery). Three field batteries, each of four guns (either 4-in. or 5.9-in.), were thought to be situated on the east headland commanding the harbour, behind the town near Arques-la-Bataille, where divisional H.Q. was believed to be located, and near Appeville, not far from the fortified position " Quatre Vents " Farm. Besides these there were a number of A.A. batteries, both light and heavy, some being dual-purpose guns; and of course included in the defences were machine guns in pill-boxes, and small guns behind concrete defences.2

In estimating the suitability of Dieppe as a target, the question of naval and aerial covering bombardment had also to be considered. Very powerful bomber and fighter forces were within easy flying distance of the French coast and it was possible for cruisers or even battleships to manoeuvre off the town in cornparative safety. The possibility of effective support in such cases depends partly on the nature of the terrain. If the coast line is fairly low with more or less open country extending some distance inland, the enemy's defences can be bombarded and his lines of supply and reinforcement disrupted during the critical initial disembarkation. The conditions however were not altogether favourable in this respect. Pill-boxes and light gun positions round the harbour

ORIGINS OF THE PLAN 3

entrance, enfilading the coast line to the westward, could be engaged by direct fire but the built-up area near the main landing beaches constituted a serious obstacle to naval or aerial bombardment during an actual landing. The shell bursts

from heavy naval guns would probably have endangered the landing parties, whilst the distance between the sea and the houses was much too narrow for aerial bombardment. There was of course the alternative of heavy protracted bombing to flatten the houses along the sea-front prior to the raid, but it was considered that such action would probably warn the enemy of the impending assault and kill a large number of Frenchmen.

B. ORIGINS OF THE PLAN

The possibilities of an attack were first investigated by the Target Committee of Combined Operations Headquarters early in April 1942,1 and about the middle of that month the Planning Staff of that Headquarters-under the general direction of Captain J. Hughes Hallett, R.N. began to prepare an outline plan.

A frontal assault was not contemplated, landings on each flank being proposed

-at Quiberville, some six miles to the west of Dieppe, and at Oriel-sur-Mer, about double the distance to the east. These flank landings were to be of roughly brigade strength, and a third brigade was to be held as a floating reserve prepared to reinforce either of the flank landings or to synchronise a frontal attack in Dieppe with the approach of the other brigades to the city.

On 30th March 1942, the Chiefs of Staff had made their approval for the military part of the plans for large raids contingent upon their being agreed by a senior officer nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.2 In this instance Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery was chosen. He was, at the time, C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, in which the 2nd Canadian Division

was stationed. He at once criticised the military plan on the ground that the distances to be covered by the troops landed on the flanks were such that the city could not possibly be captured within the period dictated by Naval and Air considerations. He therefore proposed that a dawn frontal assault should be made instead, synchronised with two smaller landings either side to seize the cliffs which overlooked Dieppe.

Under this decision of the Chiefs of Staff, H.Q. Home Forces became closely associated with the preparation of the outline plan, and on 14th April their representatives joined the planning syndicate, General Montgomery being kept in broad touch with progress.

In the course of the discussions that took place during April, certain disadvantages which might derive from the C.O.H.Q. proposals for convergingattacks on Dieppe were examined. Chief of these was held to be the possible loss of surprise which could occur before the main assaults on the city had time to develop from the flank landings, six and twelve miles away. In this connection, some of the intervening country-particularly to the west-was enclosed and lent itself to delaying action. Further, if time was to be lost in bringing our

PREPARATIONS

strength to bear against Dieppe itself, it would not only make re-embarkation within the time limit dictated by Naval and Air considerations very difficult, but would also increase the risk of German reserves being enabled to intervene in the battle.

These considerations, among others, led to the preparation of two schemes (see Plan 1). One (Scheme A) envisaged a frontal assault preceded by flank attacks at Puits and Pourville whilst parachute and glider-borne troops were simultaneously to capture the batteries at Berneval and Varengeville-sur-Mer. The second (Scheme B), which was in principle a modified version of the original C.O.H.Q. plan, was to dispense with an initial frontal assault and to land two battalions at Puits and two at Pourville, with two more as a floating reserve, whilst a seventh battalion and a battalion of tanks landed at Quiberville.

When the two plans of attack had been prepared they were considered at a conference held on 18th April, at which the Commander-in-Chef, Home Forces, was represented by his Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier, General Staff (Plans). In the course of the discussion which then took place, it became apparent that the weight of Army opinion favoured Scheme A. The Naval view was that though a frontal assault was hazardous it was feasible from the naval aspect, subject to a short interval being accepted between the main frontal attack and the subsidiary flank landings, in order to give the L.S.I. sufficient sea room; it was immaterial whether the main attack preceded or followed the flank attacks. All were agreed that the landings should take place in darkness, that they should follow as closely as possible after a heavy air bombardment of Dieppe, and that low-flying attacks against targets ashore should take place as soon as there was sufficient light.

On 25th April the first formal meeting to consider the plans for the operation (to which the code-name Rutter" had been given) was held, Vice-Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, being in the chair. The question of a frontal assault on Dieppe was discussed.

The Army representatives explained the reasons which led them to favour this form of attack. In the first place, to land any force as far west as Quiberville would make a surprise attack on Dieppe more difficult to achieve. In the second place, tanks landed on that beach would have to cross two streams which might prove to be considerable obstacles. The bridges over them would have to be seized at a very early stage in order to make sure they were not demolished by the enemy. Lastly, all available intelligence at that time showed that Dieppe was lighdy held by a single low-category battalion, and that the troops in the town, numbering not more than 1,400 all told, could not be heavily reinforced for some time and not by more than 2,500 men within four hours. As the operation was a raid, the time on shore was limited by the anticipated rate of reinforcement of the enemy and governed by the distance of' the landing from the objective. The Naval Planners still expressed doubts as to the expediency of the frontal assault, basing the opinion on general and not on naval grounds.1 It was again emphasised that the landing would be preceded by a bombing attack on the town just before the craft carrying the assaulting troops touched down. This air bombardment would be of maximum intensity, and it was

thought that the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks by low-flying aircraft to offer stout or prolonged resistance. The bombing was to be carried out from both high and low level, the high-altitude attack being against the town generally, the low-level attack against the sea front and beach defences. The question of fighter cover and air support for the land forces was debated at some length, for it was realised that support from the air would be of paramount importance. It was agreed that the system of Command should be a Joint Command exercised by Naval, Military and R.A. F. Force Commanders.

5. OBJECTIVES

The.. Outline Plan, including the principle of a frontal assault preceded by bombing, was then adopted and on 9th May was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.1

The objectives2 were defined as:-

(15) E- and R-Boats and Siebel Ferries

(16) Area of town occupied by Germans.

But the main purpose of the raid was not these minor objectives. A largescale amphibious invasion of France would eventually be necessary and before serious planning for this operation could be undertaken,. it was essential to mount a raid on a divisional scale so as to decide whether a direct attack on a defended port was a reasonable operation of war,3 or whether invading forces should be landed on open beaches at a distance from the objective. It was also necessary to test the different types of landing craft under fire and to obtain experience of an opposed landing of tanks Though the raid was to all appearances a complete and costly failure,. the lessons learnt were invaluable and were the basis of planning for all subsequent landing operations.

1 BR., pp.2,3. The Canadian history gives the date as 11th May.

2 BR., p.l.

3 Admiral-of-the Fleet Lord Mountbatten has explained that an important object of the raid was to test the possibility of capturing a fully equipped enemy-occupied port in a condition sufficiently intact and undamaged to land and maintain the follow- up formations. This aspect of the operation may have had its influence on the decision to abandon the high-Ievel bombing of Dieppe as originally planned (see Section 7) and on the scale of naval gunfire provided.

6 PREPARATIONS

6. CONFIRMATION OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN

On 13th May the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the Preliminary Plan as the basis for detailed planning by the Force Commanders. It approved also the employment of Canadian troops and appointed as Military and Air Force Commanders, respectively, Major-General J. H. Roberts and Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh~Mallory. The Naval Force Commander (Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman) was not appointed till 1st June, as he was then serving in the Middle East, but his place on the planning committee was taken by Commodore T. H. Back. It had also been decided on a previous occasion that the naval Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (Admiral Sir William James), would be responsible for certain aspects of the raid. He was to settle all administrative questions, decide the time of sailing, make arrangements for the passage to and fro and provide the necessary naval cover. Operations between the time of landing and re-embarkation were, however, outside his sphere of control. The meeting also agreed to seek from the Cabinet approval for the bombing of the town should the Force Commanders deem that this was desirable. A minute was accordingly sent to the Prime Minister on 19th May pointing out that, under the then Cabinet ruling, targets in France could only be bombed when weather conditions permitted of accurate attacks, a restriction which had proved a handicap at St. Nazaire. On that occasion aircraft of Bomber Command arriving over the town stirred up the defences, but the diversionary attack which was an important part of the plan was rendered abortive by cloud conditions hiding the dock area which was their objective.

It was hoped that this ruling might be relaxed in cases of Combined Operations. This permission was obtained. On 1st June the Chiefs of Staff were informed that, though the Prime Minister was sti11 against indiscriminate bombing of French towns at night, an exception would be made in the case of coastal raids.

The plan now provided for a frontal assault by infantry battalions and up to 30 Army tanks with support from sea and air. The main assault was to be preceded by high-level bombing and by flank attacks delivered half an hour previously, by comparatively small forces. One battalion was to capture the A.A. coast defence and mobile batteries in the area east of Dieppe, and then aid in taking the town. Two other battalions were to perform a similar role to the west and also capture the airfield of St. Aubin. Simultaneously, parachute troops were to attack coastal and A.A. batteries and the divisional headquarters 4 miles south-east of Dieppe. The whole operation was to be carried out on two tides, the rear parties being withdrawn under cover of darkness.

1 Admiral Baillie-Grohman would have liked a battleship to have been made available, but it was explained to him that one of the purposes of the raid was to provide a success-or what could be represented as a success-to hearten public opinion after the shocks it had endured in the last six months. whatever happened, the operation could not have been represented as a success had a battleship been lost by mine or otherwise in the confined waters off Dieppe.

7

7. MODIFICATION OF PLAN

On 5th June a modification to the plan was introduced. It was decided, at a meeting between the executive of Combined Operations, the Force Cornmanders and General Montgomery, to abandon the high-level bombing of

Dieppe on air and military grounds. The Air Force Commander was of the opinion that the bombing of the port itself during the night prior to the assault would not be the most profitable way to use bombers and might only result in putting the enemy on the alert. The Military Commander took the view that the destruction of large numbers of houses and the setting of a considerable portion of the town on fire would probably prevent the tanks from operating in streets choked with debris.1. As an alternative to high-level bombing the Air Force Commander proposed that diversionary bombing attacks should be made on Boulogne and the airfields at Abbeville-Drucat and Crecy. In view of the above opinions, high-level bombing was abandoned in favour of diversionary air attacks which, it was considered, would occupy the attention of theGerman radar organization and might put out of action for some hours two airfields which the enemy would certainly wish to use during the operation. It was also agreed that cannon-fighters should attack the beach defences and the high ground on either side of Dieppe and that the German Divisional Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille should be bombed.2 These decisions represented an important modification of the original plan. The bombardment was now to be limited to the 4-in. guns of six destroyers and the 250-lb bombs of the Hurricanes.3 A force of M.G.Bs. was to operate off Bou1ogne in the early stages of the raid to give the impression that the assault would take place there instead of at Dieppe.

2 B.R., p.6.

3 The B.R. does not state whether the question of using more powerful warships was considered. C.-in-C., Portsmouth (Admiral Sir William Jamcs), in his letter to the Admiralty dated 6th September 1942, stated that in his opinion "a ship with heavy guns and up-to-date control for bombardment might have made a very material difference to the course of the operation after the first landing." Naval Force Commander stated (Narrative, para. 30): "A capital ship could have been operated during the first hour of daylight without undue risk and would probably have turned the tide of battle in our favour." The report of Rear-Admiral McGrigor's cornmittee (in M.051641/42) stated that a battleship could have been usefully employed immediately before the landing, but the committee was doubtful whether a capital ship would have been of much use after the troops had landed.

4 2lst-26th June, 4th-9th July, 20th-25th July, 3rd-8th August.

8

landing was now to be made as near low water as possible and to be completed or nearly completed by the next high water. Though on the one hand this "one tide" plan had the advantage of increasing the intensity of air support by shortening the time during which cover would have to be given, on the other hand, it tended to complicate the task of removing the German barges in Dieppe harbour, which was one of the objects of the raid.

8. ABANDONMENT OF " RUTTER "

These modifications were accepted, but the weather continued unfavourable and as the prospects of improvement were poor, the operation was cancelled on 7th July. Early that morning the project had received a setback. Four German fighter bombers, probably F.W. 190s, dropped four 500-kg bombs on two L.S.I. (H.M.S. Princess Astrid and H.M.S. Princess Josephine Char/otte) then lying in Yarmouth Roads, Isle of Wight, with troops embarked ready for the operation. Both ships were hit, the Josephine Charlotte being severe]y damaged. Large adjustments in the operation orders were rapidly made by the Naval and Military Force Commanders' staffs, and despatched the same day to all ships concerned, and the expedition could have sailed at any time had the weather permitted, albeit the operation would have been somewhat handicapped. This episode probably influenced the decision to cancel the expedition and disperse the forces.

9. OPERATION " JUBILEE "

Subsequently it was decided to remount the operation under the name "Jubilee" as a "one tide" plan. General Montgomery strongly deprecated the revival of the operation, on the grounds that once the fully briefed forces had been dispersed, all hope of secrecy would be lost and he recommended that the raid on Dieppe should be cancelled" for all time". The Chiefs of Staff, however, after careful consideration, approved the operation, and in the event it actually achieved surprise.2

of Commandos for airborne troops for the attacks on the extreme flanks to capture the batteries at Berneval and Varengeville, since the use of paratroops demanded ideal weather conditions,3 and also a considerable time would be required for briefing. It had originally been intended to use ten drifters to create a smoke-walled "sanctuary", in which the landing and other craft would lie while the troops were ashore; in the final plan these were dispensed with, as it was considered that the same result could be produced by smoke screens laid

1 Information supplied by Admiral Baillie-Grohman.

2 Captain Hughes Hallett pointed out that, with the troops already trained as they were, the raid could be mounted in such away as to make it very difficult of detection in advance, for there was no need to concentrate the force beforehand. The various units could move direct from their stations to their ports of embarkation, and embark there on the same evening on which they were to sail. Further dispersion before sailing was obtained by sending certain troops direct from England in their landing craft, instead of in L.S.I. for transhipment oof the French coast, as-previously planned.

3 Weathcr conditions permitting the landing of troops, tanks etc., from the naval point of view were not necessarily suitable for paratroop operations. In point of fact, on the day of the operation the weather, though satisfactory, from the naval point of view, would have made the employment of airborne troops impossible.

9

by destroyers, landing craft and from the air. Smoke-carrying aircraft, too, were to mask the defences on the east cliff at the moment the main landing touched down.

Before Operation "Jubilee" could take place there were changes in the Command. In the Army chain of command, in view of the preponderant part to be taken by the Canadians, Lieut.-General H. G. D. Crerar, G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps, took the place of Lieut.-General Montgomery,1 who thereafter took no part in the operation.2 On the naval side, Rear-Admiral BaillieGrohman, and his Chief of Staff, Commodore Back, were no longer available, and at the suggestion of Lord Louis Mountbatten two members of the naval staff of Combined Operations Headquarters Captain J. Hughes Hallett and Commander (acting Captain) J. D. Luce were appointed as Naval Force Commander and Chief of Staff on 17th July.

By early August the plan had assumed its final shape. There were to be four flank attacks launched at nautical twilight, followed half an hour later by the assault on Dieppe. The landing places (see Plan 1) were to be:-

Beach at Berneval Yellow I

Beach at Belleville-sur-Mer Yellow 2

Beach at Puits Blue

Dieppe

East Red

West White

West of Dieppe

Beach at Pourville Green

Beach near Varengeville Orange 1

Beach 1/4 mile east of River Saane Orange 2

1 Constitutional questions were involved, the Canadian General Officers being responsible through Lieut.-Gencral McNaughten, G.O.C.-in-C., Ist Canadian Army, to the Canadian Government. The matter is dealt with at length in the Canadian Official History, Six Years of War, Vol. I, Chapter X.

2 As events turned out, General Montgomery left the United Kingdom for the Middle East on 10th August, about a week before the raid on Dieppe took place. In his Memoirs published in 1958, Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, after alluding to his objection to the remounting of the operation on security grounds, criticises the revised plan for "Jubilee " on two counts, to which he states that he himself would not have agreed:

(a) The elimination of paratroops and replacement by Commandos. " Commando units, if thought necessary, should have been an addition to, and not a replacement of the paratroops.

(b) The elimination of any preliminary bombing of the defences from the air. "The demoralisation of the enemy defence by preliminary bombing was essential (as was done in Normandy in 1944) just before the troops touched down on the beaches."

As regards (a), the reason for the elimination of paratroops has been given in the foregoing. It is pertinent to remark that in the event the Commando on the western flank was completely successful in capturing the battery at Varengeville; and on the eastern flank, but for a fortuitous meeting with a German convoy when approaching the coast which resulted in a failure to land most of the troops, there is no reason to suppose that they would not have been equally successful. As it was, the 20 troops who got ashore considerably embarassed the battery with rifle fire during the main landing. As regards (b), the decision to eliminate heavy air bombardment had been taken at a meeting as early as 5th June, at which General Montgomery presided (B.R., p.6; Six Years of War"'; p.336), for reasons which no doubt seemed adequate at the time.

The Field-Marshal also remarks that there were too many authorities with a hand in it, "there was no one single operation Commander who was solely responsible for the operation from start to fnish". With the C.C.O.-responsible, but without an entirely free band-C.in.C., Home Forces, C.-in-C., 1st Canadian Army and their delegates, C.-in-C., Portsmouth, all, to a greater or less degree involved, besides the R.A.F. Commands, the set-up was certainly complicated. But it must not be forgotten that this was the first large scale combined operation of the kind, and to a large extent experimental.

I0

The naval force1 consisted of 237 vessels, viz:-

Destroyers 8 Chasseurs 7

Gunboat 1 Landing Craft, Tank 24

Sloop 1 Landing Craft, Flak (large) 6

Landing Ship, Infantry 9 Landing Craft, Support 8

Steam Gunboats 4 Landing Craft, Mechanized 7

Motor Gunboats 12 Landing Craft, Personnel 74

Motor Launches 16 Landing Craft, Assault 60 They carried 6,088 troops:

Canadian Army 305 officers; 4,658 other ranks=4,963

Commandos Nos. 3,4,6 and R.M. 65 " 992 " =1,057

Inter-Allied Commando 18

U.S. 1st Ranger 50

Total: 6,088

Airforce oonsisted of:-Fighters

Fighters 60 squadrons

Fighter-bombers 2 "

Bombers 5 "

Total: 67 squadrons

The attack from Yellow beaches aimed at the capture of the " Goebbels" battery near Berneval, and that from Orange beaches at the corresponding one-" Hess "-near Varengeville. Of the inner flank attacks, that from Blue beach was designed to take another battery-" Rommel "-and attack in the rear the east headland above Dieppe. From Green beach, troops were to capture the fortified position at " Quatre Vents " Farm and take the western headland overlooking the town in the rear. Other troops were to move up the Scie Valley against the airfield of St. Aubin and the German divisional headquarters, which was believed to be at Arques-la-Bataille.2 Supported by tanks, the troops landed on the main (Red and White) beaches were to take and hold the town. The east and west headlands were to be heavily bombed by Bostons, as were also the battery on the east cliff and the two batteries behind the town, and immediately after aircraft were to throw smoke screens over the two headlands. Fighters armed with cannon were to co-operate with the attacks on the Berneval and Varengeville batteries, and were also to shoot up the defences along the front at Dieppe.

Destroyers would provide covering bombardment from seaward, while L.C.F. and L.C.S. would give close support during the landings. Once the defences were mastered and our troops were established in the town, the gunboat Locust and the " Chasseurs" carrying the Royal Marine Commando were to enter Dieppe harbour, cut out the landing barges, trawlers and any other naval vessels and demolish naval installations and harbour works.

Unfavourable weather and tides caused some delay, but on 17th August the forecast for the next two days, though not very good, was better than that expected later, and at l000 3 the necessary preliminary order was issued for the expedition to sail on the night of 18/19th August. The flank landings were

1 Details of forces are given in Appendices A and B.

2 In point of fact the headqaarters had been removed to Envermeu, six mile, further east (Canadian History, p.352)

3 Zone minus 1 Time (B.S.T.) is used throughout.

11

1 Nautical twilight (sun 12 deg below horizon) conmenced 0431: Civil twilight (Sun 6 deg below horizon) 0515. Sunrise was at 0550.

2 BR., p.10.

3 Before sailing, the Naval Force Commander, afler consulting C.C..O., placed on record the circumstances in which he intended to abandon the expedition, viz.., if a considerable number of ships carrying the troops were sunk on passage (B.R., p.l0; and M, enclosure 2, par. 23), and went on to state that " if a number of heavy bombers could have been provided to make

flying attacles on enemy batteries, his conclusion as to the losses he would accept would have been profoundly modified".

12

CHAPTER II

The Passage

12

13

11. THE PASSAGE (PLAN 2)

The passage was to be made in darkness. The moon (in its first quarter) set at 2316. 1 The size of the expedition, the necessity for dispersal and the existance of the enemy minefield necessitated an elaborate time-table for its passage. With one or two minor exceptions this was faithfully adhered to up to its closing stages. The force was organised in 13 groups.2 Groups I and 3 consisted of theL.S.I.s bound for Orange, Green and Blue beaches respectively, and Group 4 of those for Red and White beaches.

Groups 5 and 6, bound for Yellow and Green beaches, and Group 7 carrying the floating reserve, were composed of L.C.P. flotillas.

Groups 8 to 12 consisted of the tank landing craft and Group 13 the Chasseurs carrying the R.M. Commandos and the Alresford. Each group included its Coastal forces and close support craft, M.G.B.s, L.C.F., etc.

Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 13 and part of 10 sailed from Portsmouth and Southampton, the rest from Newhaven and Shoreham. Those from Southampton had to leave before dark; in order to baffle the routine German evening photographic air reconnaissance, they were elaborately disguised to resemble a coastal convoy.

At 2125, 18th August, the Queen Emma (Landing Ship, Infantry) passed the East Solent Gate leading Groups 3, 2, 1 and 4 followed by destroyers, all in single line ahead with the escorting S.G.B.s and M.G.B.s disposed on either beam.3 The speed of the Queen Emma being slightly in excess of that intended, the Naval Commander in H.M.S. Calpe made a signal to her at 0016, 19th August; to reduce speed to 18 knots. The Calpe led the destroyers to take station ahead of her, and at 0045 and again at 0106 altered course to enter the western passage through the minefield, which she did at 0110. The Queen Emma should have followed, but failed to observe the destroyers' alterations of course and, with the L.S.I. of Groups 1, 2 and 3, entered the eastern passage instead. Here at 0140 they overtook the Fernie, which had joined Groups 5 and 8 off Newhaven and was leading them down the far channel according to plan. The minefield had been crossed by 0155 and the L.S.I. had disappeared from sight to starboard. On reaching QQ4, the Calpe hauled out to the eastward and stopped. At 0145 she sighted the L.S.I. of Groups 1, 2 and 3 and signalled her position by flashing lamp. Twenty-five mimites later the Glengyle,4 leading Group 4, emerged from the western channel exactly according to schedule and the Calpe proceeded to accompany them to their " lowering position" 4(RR),

10 miles frona Dieppe. Group 4 was escorted by the Slazak and Brocklesby. The Locust failed to keep up with the rest of Group 4 and, with M.L.291, crossed the minefield by an unswept route and was at QQ4 by 0245. The first swarms of small craft were then emerging from the eastern channel, with Groups 5 and 8 leading.

1 l8th August, moonset 2316. 19th August, nautical twilight 0431.

2 For details of Groups, see Appendix A.II.

12. THE APPROACH (Plan 2)

As soon as they had cleared the minefield, the leading forces formed up for the opening attack. In the van with their escorting craft were the Prince Albert1 of Group 1 carrying No. 4 Commando, the Princess Beatrix1 and Invicta1 of Group 2 carrying the South Saskatchewan Regiment, the Queen Emma,, Princess Astrid of Group 3 with the Royal Regiment of Canada; and Group 5 with No.3 Cornmando. These were intended to carry out the flank landings at 0450 at Orange, Green, Blue and Yellow beaches respectively. They were followed by the Glengyle,1 Prince Charles1 and Prince Leopold' of Group 4 with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish, who were to make the initial assault on the beaches of Dieppe itself at 0520, and the Duke of Wellington' with reinforcements for Blue beach. Next came the Calpe (the headquarters ship), Fernie (the stand-by headquarters ship) with the Locust and Group 8. Behind were Group 6 with the Camerons of Canada who were to land on Green beach at 0520, and Group 7 with the Fusiliers Mont Royal who constituted the floating reserve: then followed Group 9, with Groups 10 and 11 far astern, all three carrying tanks for Red and White beaches. The destroyers acted as screening forces, the second division (Garth, Berkeley, A/brighton and Bleasdale) being to starbboard, and the third division (Slazak and Brocklesby) to port. The L.S.I. now made for their respective lowering positions (SS, GG, SB and RR2 for Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively), and all craft were safely in the water within three minutes of schedule-0300 for Groups 1, 2 and 3, 0320 for Group 4. The distance from the lowering positions to the beaches was about ten miles. This long run-in was accepted because it was desired to keep the landing ships outside the range of the enemy radar. The L.S.I. turned somewhat unwillingly for home, the monotony of their return passage being broken only by a minor collision between the Princess Beatrix and Invicta. The landing craft formed up. The Pnncess Astrid's flotilla lost precious minutes through some of their number forming upon an M.G.B. which, having got out of station, had appeared near the spot where M.G.B. 316 was expected.

 

 

13. SITUATION 0340, 19th AUGUST

By 0340 it was possible to view the progress made with considerable satisfaction. There had been some inevitable deviations from programme, but they had been neither numerous nor important. The L.S.l. were steaming homeward after accomplishing their task successfully and the first waves of landing craft had formed up and were being led in to their respective beaches as follows:-

Meanwhile from 0330 to 0450 M.G.B.s 6, 7 and 9 were making the small-scale diversion off Boulogne according to plan. Depth charges and smoke floats were dropped, but the enemy seemed unimpressed. No hostile ships were sighted, nor was there any sign of activity ashore.

It had been thought possible that the convoy might be attacked by enemy E-boats, but none were sighted. They were otherwise engaged. The fifth German S-boat (M.T.B.) flotilla was laying mines during the night in Lyme Bay; the fouth S-boat flotilla was at Boulogne, and after the attack commenced the German Naval Command decided that it was useless to employ E-boats against a force protected by destroyers. Just when all was going so smoothly there occurred an unfortunate mischance.

14. ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (Plan 4)

During the passage Group 5 had become somewhat disorganized, a slight delay outside the harbour necessitating a rather greater speed than the L.C.P. could comfortably maintain. Group 5 consisted of 23 L.C.P.(L) carrying No.3 Commando which was to land on Yellow beaches to the eastward. The group was escorted by S.G.B.5., M.L.346 and L.C.F.(L) 1, the whole under the command of Commander D. B. Wyburd, R.N., while the troops were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Dumford-Slater.

At 0340 the Slazak and Brocklesby crossed the bows of Group 5 from starhoard to port.2 Then came a critical interlude. At 0347 Group 5 suddenly encountered an enemy convoy consisting of five small motor coasters escorted by three escort vessels. Three patrol vessels off Dieppe apparently supported this convoy later.3 About 7 miles from the shore S.G.B.5 sighted a ship on her port bow and immediately the group was lit up by enemy star-shell. It was at first thought that the Slazak and Brockleby had mistaken Group 5 for the enemy, but it was soon seen that this was not the case; in fact, the destroyers at this time were about 4 rniles to the N.N.E.4

 

The enemy opened a heavy fire on our ships, mainly with light A.A. guns but also with guns of up to 3-in. or 4-in. calibre.1 Commander Wyburd had " decided beforehand that, should the enemy be encountered, he would continue his course and speed, and endeavour to fight his way through". He had issued orders to this effect, being convinced that any general alteration of course and speed would so disorganize the formation of Group 5 as to render an organized landing impossible.2 S.G.B.5 accordingly continued on her course at 9 1/2 knots for about 10 minutes. She was the enemy's main target and was hit many times. Five hits were scored on her boiler, all her guns were put out of action, her wireless was disabled and 40 per cent of those on board became casualties, though, surprisingly enough, only one man was killed.

Owing to lack of illuminant our ships were not able to see the enemy and could only fire at the points from which tracer seemed to come. Commander Wuyburd remained on the bridge under heavy fire and showed great gallantry

and determination, but at 0407 S.G.B.5 was silenced and partially disabled and it became evident that the plan to fight a way through had failed. By this time the L.C.P. had scattered and S.G.B.5 turned away at 6 knots.

M.L.346, leading Group 5, had been hit several times. At 0412, having lost contact with the group, she set course for Yellow beaches. She called up S.G.B.5 continually so as to report the position but "all waves appeared to be jammed, no messages could be sent."3

L.C.F. (L) 1, armed with two twin 4-in. guns, continued the action and although her fire control was soon disabled she fought mth great energy and determination and succeeded in setting one of the enemy on fire and claimed to have sunk another.4

 

 

15. THE DESTROYERS

The Slazak and Brocklesby took no part in the action, as the captain of the Slazak, who was senior officer of 3rd Destroyer Division, thought that the firing was from the shore. As the special function of the destroyers was to protect the convoy it is unfortunate that the situation was not realised. At 0530 the Brocklesby parted company with the Slazak to investigate a burning ship 4 miles 340^ from Berneval. This was UJ.1404, abandoned by her crew who were in the water. Survivors to the number of 25 were rescued, but the commanding officer had been killed early in the action. The Brocklesby shelled the enemy craft, which finally blew up at about 0645.

The Garth (senior officer of 2nd Destroyer Division) had sighted star-shell at 0351 followed by tracer fire, and thought that the 3rd Division was firing at enemy shipping. Increasing speed, he steered towards the firing, but, before reaching the scene of the action, decided that it was necessary to alter course to the southward to get into station astern of the landing craft at the proper time, so as to cover the main assault with their bombarding fire. By this time

1 UJ. 1404 was armed with one 88-mm gun and smailer weapons.

2 B.R., p.12, para. 66.

3 Report of C.O. of M.L. 346 in M., App. 8, p. 55. This probably means that there was such traffic congestion on all waves that no messages could be sent.

4 Commander Wyburd in his narrative (M., App. 7, p.50) says one enemy trawler was sunk for certain and probably two more. The German report mentions no losses among ships of convoy, but says the convoy was dispersed north of Dieppe and that at 0745 a small part of it was off St.Valery-en-Caux. The report also says that three harbour look-out vessels were off Dieppe when the action began. These retired into harbour, where one sank, probably from a hit received during the batile. It must be remembered, however, that this is essentially a military report.

 

 

 

1 One of these arrived at Newhaven commanded by a sergeant of the Hampshires, all the Naval crew being casualties. He navigated the craft with an army prismatic compass.

2 There are discrepancies in the different accounts of the movements of L.C.P. after the action. S.G.B.5 returned to Newhaven with three LC.P.; it must he assumcd that two of these came ftom another group, or else that they were two of the damagcd craft. As report of C.O. of S.G.B.5 is not includcd in the Appendix to M, it is impossible to be definite about this point. The report of C.O. of L.C.F.(L) 1 is also not included in M.

3 H.M.S. Garth had obtained a contact at 0328 of some vessel some 24 miles to the westward.

The Locust, between entries of 0212 and 0245, notes: " Signals were received during passage indicating the movements of certain small craft on the French coast."3 The only mention by the Calpe is: "0348 observed engagement between surface craft."4 The destroyers most concerned were the Slazak and Brocklesby, who were acting as screening force to the eastward. It is clear that to both of them the encounter came as a complete surprise, and to judge from the information available neither had any idea that unidentified craft were in the vicinity. Even after the action had started the importance of immediate support was not realised. Nor apparently had it been possible to discern the proximity of a force whose approach had been indicated in the signals from Portsmouth. The Naval Force Commander says: "At about 0350 gunfire was observed to E.S.E. which it was realised must be in the immediate vicinity of Group 5. At the time I considered that this might be caused by an E-boat attack, but with the knowledge that the Slazak and Brocklesby were within about 4 miles of Group 5 and that Calpe was the only ship in the immediate vicinity of the Glengyle and Group 4, it was decided to keep Group 4 in sight."5

1 In the list of " important signals " (enclosure 5 of M) the two signals from C.-in-C., Portsmouth, are not mentioned, and it is not clear whether, or by what ships, the second signal was received. Calpe's signal log has not been seen.

2 M, App. 22. p.91

3 M, App. 20, p.83.

7 Captain Hughes Hallett subsequently expressed the opinion that the Polish Commander Tyminiski of the Slazak failed to comprehend the operation orders; he himself would have preferred Lieut.-Commander Pumphrey of the Brocklesby as Senior Officer of the destroyers. It was not until after the operation was over that Captain Hughes Hallett found that a secret order permitting a British officer so be placed in charge, regardless of seniority, in such circurnstances, was actually in existence. This order was, however, issued so Comrnandewin-Chief only-a good example of the dangers of excessive security.

8 B.R., p.52, para.393 .

9 M, App. 4, p.33.

RESULTS OF THE ACTION 19

He had issued orders to this effect before the operation began.1 The Naval Force Commander does not comment on this point beyond stating that he considers that Commander Wyburd should have made more use of the speed and smoke-laying capabilities of his S.G.B.2 Commander Wyburd in his report3 does not mention either of these points. It is clear, however, that no support was received from the destroyers and though there is considerable conflict of evidence as to their precise position relative to Group 5 when the action opened, the distance between them was evidently not more than 4 miles (see Plan 4) at 0347.

(End of Part 1)